Electronic voting system

ABSTRACT

A method is described that involves creating a private key and a public key cryptographic key pair, generating a unique and random identifier for a voter&#39;s vote and accepting an election vote from said voter. The vote and identifier are electronically signed with the private key to create a digital signature. The vote and identifier are provided in a human readable format to the voter.

CLAIM TO PRIORITY

This is a continuation of and claims the benefit of U.S. patentapplication No. U.S. Ser. No. 13/294,936, titled “ELECTRONIC VOTINGSYSTEM” filed on Nov. 11, 2011 which claims the benefit of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 11/975,401, titled “ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM” filedOct. 19, 2007, which further claims priority to and the benefit of, U.S.Provisional Application No. 60/853,064, “ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM” filedon Oct. 20, 2006 all of which are incorporated by reference in theirentirety.

BACKGROUND

Voting is one of the hallmarks of democracy, but counting votes orballots is a perennial problem. Recent elections have been marred bycontroversies suggesting that ballots were improperly counted in variousstatewide and national races in the United States, and allegations oftheft of elections occur regularly in other parts of the world. Electionmonitors are a regular feature in many parts of the world.

Historically, certain types of election systems have allowed for playwithin the system—the ability to change the outcome of a close electionby committing election fraud in difficult to detect ways. Allegations ofelection fraud have played a part in many historical elections, notleast of which was the close national race between Kennedy and Nixon in1960. Moreover, machine politics has a long and colorful history ingeneral, with suggestions that political machines could and did throwelections to favored candidates, whether honestly or dishonestly. It hasalso been suggested that some machines routinely throw elections whereno risk exists, merely to keep the machine working effectively.

Problems with counting ballots corrode the system in a variety of ways.Voters can be discouraged from voting and thereby exercising rights dueto a belief that a vote will not count. Election supervisors experiencepoor morale due to allegations of fraud or incompetence brought on byproblems with voting—whether legitimate or not. Any discretion accordedto the person counting votes provides power, but also provides anopening for criticism about use of such discretion.

Thus, it may be useful to provide a voting system which eliminates mostforms of discretion and judgment—that related to whether to count aballot due to issues such as processing of a ballot or questions aboutvoter intent. Technology potentially provides a solution to suchproblems. However, many technological solutions lack features desirablefor a robust and complete voting system. Thus, it may be desirable toprovide a system which allows for an auditable record of votes andpublic access to vote information.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention is illustrated by way of example in theaccompanying drawings. The drawings should be understood as illustrativerather than limiting.

FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of an electronic voting system.

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a precinct voting machine.

FIG. 3 illustrates an embodiment of a central voting system.

FIG. 4A illustrates an embodiment of a process of receiving a vote.

FIG. 4B illustrates an embodiment of a process of counting a vote.

FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a process of receiving an absenteevote.

FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of a process of converting an absenteevote.

FIG. 7 illustrates an embodiment of a network which may be used with anelectronic voting system.

FIG. 8 illustrates an embodiment of a machine which may be used with oras part of an electronic voting system.

FIG. 9 illustrates an embodiment of a process of checking a vote.

FIG. 10 illustrates an embodiment of a certificate used to evidence avote.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A system, method and apparatus is provided for an electronic votingsystem. The specific embodiments described in this document representexamples or embodiments of the present invention, and are illustrativein nature rather than restrictive.

In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerousspecific

details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding ofthe invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the artthat the invention can be practiced without these specific details. Inother instances, structures and devices are shown in block diagram formin order to avoid obscuring the invention.

Reference in the specification to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment”means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic describedin connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodimentof the invention. The appearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” invarious places in the specification are not necessarily all referring tothe same embodiment, nor are separate or alternative embodimentsmutually exclusive of other embodiments. Features and aspects of variousembodiments may be integrated into other embodiments, and embodimentsillustrated in this document may be implemented without all of thefeatures or aspects illustrated or described.

FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of an electronic voting system. System100 includes a central voting machine, a set of precinct voting machinesand potentially a network interface. Central voting machine 110 providesa central machine or set of machines used by an election authority (e.g.a Secretary of State or Supervisor of Elections) to tabulate votes andprovide vote totals. Precinct voting machines 120 provide individualmachines used at voting locations (e.g. precincts)—the machines votersuse to cast their votes. A network interface 130 is provided for thosesystems where access to information for the outside world is desired.However, each linkage shown here may be provided through secure means,or may simply exist solely for purposes of one-way transfer ofinformation (e.g. from precinct to central authority or from centralauthority to network). Thus, the linkages may be provided throughphysical transfers of media embodying information, rather than through adedicated or existing physical coupling. In some embodiments, thecentral voting machine 110 may only receive data in transportable mediafrom the precinct voting machines, and then may produce results datawhich can be transferred on other transportable media to a machine usedas a network interface 130.

Particular details of the various components of the system may providefurther understanding of the system. FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment ofa precinct voting machine. Precinct voting machine 200 includes a userinterface, ballot data, a control module and WORM (write-once,read-many) media. Ballot data 220 may provide information about theballot used in the current election—or each of a set of ballots used fordifferent voters in a given election. Thus, ballot data 220 may provideformats, candidate names, information about candidates or measures, andtypes of votes (e.g. yes/no, choose one, choose 2 of 5 candidates), etc.User interface 210 may provide a presentation of data to a user in agraphical or other form (accessible systems may use sound or otherpresentation methods), and may also accept user input, such asselections of choices, requests for information, or indications ofcompletion, for example. Thus, user interface 210 may include a touchscreen, speakers, and other input and/or output devices. WORM media 240provides a storage medium on which ballots may be stored. Such storagemay involve storage of the ballot as a collection of votes along with arandom identifier, with the ballot digitally signed through use of apublic-private key pair. Moreover, the ballot may be stored randomly onthe WORM media 240 to avoid indications of which ballot matches a givenvoter. Control module 230 may coordinate actions of the othercomponents, causing user interface 210 to display ballot data 220correctly and causing a completed ballot to be stored via WORM media240.

While the precinct voting machine is used to record votes, the centralvoting machine is used to tabulate total results. FIG. 3 illustrates anembodiment of a central voting system. System 300 includes a userinterface, ballot data, a media interface, a local repository, a networkinterface and a control module. User interface 310, similarly to userinterface 210, allows for interaction with a user, displaying datarelated to received ballot records and accepting user input instructingthe system on how to proceed. Ballot data 320 may be used to interpretthe data embodied in a machine-readable medium. Media interface 340 mayaccept as input WORM media from a precinct voting machine and read dataembodied therein—allowing for tallying of votes and comparison of datawith ballot data 320. Local repository 350 may be used to store the dataretrieved from the various WORM media and to make that data accessible.Network interface 360 may be used to make tallied data available forpublication on the internet or other forms of dissemination to thepublic. Note that network interface 360 may involve a media interfacesuch as a disk drive or FLASH drive on which data is recorded—and fromwhich media may be removed for transfer to a networked machine.Alternatively, network interface 360 may be a traditional interface to anetwork such as a network card or bus interface, for example. Controlmodule 330 may be used to coordinate activities of the various modulesand to order execution of instructions.

Various processes may be carried out by the systems described, or otherembodiments of such systems. FIG. 4A illustrates an embodiment of aprocess of receiving a vote. Process 400 includes receivingauthorization for voting, presenting a voting option, receiving a vote,determining if more votes are available and proceeding to the nextvoting option, tagging a vote, signing the vote, recording the vote andclearing data in a voting machine. Process 400 and other processes ofthis document are implemented as a set of modules, which may be processmodules or operations, software modules with associated functions oreffects, hardware modules designed to fulfill the process operations, orsome combination of the various types of modules, for example. Themodules of process 400 and other processes described herein may berearranged, such as in a parallel or serial fashion, and may bereordered, combined, or subdivided in various embodiments.

At module 410, a voting machine is authorized to accept votes, such aswhen a poll worker accepts a voter's identification (according towhatever standards are in effect) and enables a machine, for example. Atmodule 420, a voting option is presented, such as a set of candidatesfor an office or a ballot measure and yes or no options, for example.This may involve retrieving ballot data specified when voting wasauthorized based on what elections a voter is eligible to vote in. Atmodule 430, a vote is received from the voter (including an indicationnot to record a vote, for example). At module 440, a determination ismade as to whether more options are available. If yes, the process movesto the next option (or set of options) at module 450, and returns topresentation at module 420.

If no options remain, the vote or set of votes (ballot) is tagged atmodule 460 with a unique identification number. Such a uniqueidentification number may be generated to uniquely identify the ballotand render it traceable, without tying the identification number to thevoter. Thus, the unique identification number may be seeded with a timeof day of balloting and may include information about the precinct andvoting machine, while ultimately being randomly generated in whole or inpart. The vote or ballot with the unique identification number is signeddigitally at module 470, using a private key of a public-private keypair. The key pair may be generated by the voting machine for the votingsession, with the private key discarded when all votes are cast and thepublic key recorded with the votes.

At module 480, the vote or ballot is recorded, such as on write-oncemedia. If the ballot is recorded in a relatively random location, thismay prevent indications of who cast the ballot—for example, randomlocations on a removable medium may be divided into sectors with a mapindicating which sectors are occupied. The ballot may be recorded at arandomly selected unoccupied sector, and the map updated to flag thatthe sector is now occupied. Recording the vote also involves producing apaper receipt for the voter and for the election authority as well. Atmodule 490, temporary memory (operating memory) of the voting machine iscleared, so the stored ballot is the only electronic record of the votesand succeeding votes from other voters do not mesh in memory withprevious votes. The process may then begin again for the next voter, forexample.

With ballots cast, the process of tallying votes can begin. One mayexpect that reports indicating a count of votes for each voting machineor each precinct may be produced, providing auditable trails andfallback copies of records. Similarly, information about public keys maybe produced in paper and electronic form to allow future authenticationof results. However, actually counting ballots should be made simpler byuse of technology—thus the WORM media may be used as the primary copy ofa ballot for counting (or initial counting) purposes.

FIG. 4B illustrates an embodiment of a process of counting a vote.Process 405 includes receiving ballot media, reading ballots, tabulatingthe ballots, updating totals, and posting ballot data. Ballot media isreceived at module 415—such as when a precinct voting machine arrivesfor tabulation at a central voting authority. Opening a sealed machinemay involve various integrity checks, or a ballot medium may bepresented by poll workers with the poll workers certifying itsauthenticity, for example. The ballots of the ballot media are read atmodule 425, determining what data is included therein. At module 435,the ballots are tabulated—this may involve checking totals againstwritten records from a precinct, for example, along with simple totalingof results. Overall totals for an election are updated at module 445,including the tabulated data from the ballot media of module 415. Theballot data is then posted publicly at module 455, such as at aninternet-accessible website. As mentioned above with respect to FIG. 3,this may involve a direct connection to a network, or providing the dataembodied in a medium for reading by a machine coupled to a network, forexample.

While voting at a precinct is the classic model, absentee voting mayalso be accomplished. FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a process ofreceiving an absentee vote. Process 500, similarly to process 400,provides a process for capturing an absentee vote. At module 510, avoting machine is authorized to accept votes, such as when a poll workeraccepts a voter's identification (according to whatever standards are ineffect) and enables a machine, for example. This may involve selecting ahome precinct for a voter and other voter-specific information (e.g.eligibility to vote on measures affecting property in a propertydistrict, for example). A voting option is presented at module 520, suchas a set of candidates for an office or a ballot measure and yes or nooptions, for example. A vote is received from the voter (including anindication not to record a vote, for example) at module 530. Adetermination is made as to whether more options are available at module540—whether voter has more measures or candidates to vote on. If yes,the process moves to the next option (or set of options) at module 550,and returns to option presentation at module 520.

If no options remain, at module 560, the vote or set of votes (ballot)is tagged with a unique identification number similar to that describedwith respect to module 460. At module 570, the vote or ballot with theunique identification number is signed digitally, using a private key ofa public-private key pair. The key pair may be generated by the votingmachine for the voting session, with the private key discarded when allvotes are cast and the public key recorded with the votes.

At module 580, the vote or ballot is recorded, such as on write-oncemedia. This media is provided for transport to the home precinct of thevoter—so it is identifiable at this point. Recording the vote alsoinvolves producing a paper receipt for the voter and for the electionauthority as well—the paper receipt and the media are packaged fortransit to the home precinct of the voter and sent, the voter keeps acopy of the receipt, and a third copy may be kept for the absenteevoting authority. At module 590, temporary memory (operating memory) ofthe voting machine is cleared, so the stored ballot is the onlyelectronic record of the votes and succeeding votes from other voters donot interact or overlap in memory with previous votes. The process maythen begin again for the next voter, for example.

With absentee ballots cast, they must then be incorporated into theultimate election tally. This may be done by including the absenteeballots in the precinct balloting on election day in some embodiments,or by using a separate voting machine to make a local ballot from theabsentee ballot. FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of a process ofconverting an absentee vote. Process 600 includes receiving an absenteeballot, checking the paper ballot for authenticity (e.g. the voter is onthe rolls for the precinct), verifying authenticity and rejecting theballot if necessary, entering the ballot media into a voting machine,recording the ballot data as a local ballot, and generating a localballot therefrom.

Thus, process 600 initiates with receipt of an absentee ballot at module610. At module 620, a poll worker or other election staffer checks theapplication for ballot to determine if the voter is eligible, the ballotis in proper form (votes in current election measures, for example), andany other requirements are complied with. At module 630, a determinationis made as to whether the absentee ballot is authentic based on thischeck. If no, the ballot is rejected at module 670, and thecorresponding identifying information is recorded with an indicationthat the ballot was not counted. This may later be accessed to verifythe result of the ballot in case of questions—and would be accessiblebased on the paper copy of the receipt kept by the voter, for example.

If the ballot is acceptable, the votes are to be recorded. At module640, the ballot media is entered into the voting machine. The ballotdata is recorded as a local ballot at module 650—such as by reading thedata from the absentee ballot media and recording it as a set of voteson a local voting machine. At module 660, the local ballot is thengenerated in much the same way a ballot is generated in a local machinewhen a voter actually interacts with the machine—through the process 400of FIG. 4, for example. Thus, an absentee ballot has a uniqueidentification number for the local precinct voting machine associatedwith it, and tracing of the vote from the absentee ballot (with itsunique identification number) to the local ballot and thence topublished results may occur. Moreover, while absentee balloting iscontemplated for remote locations (e.g. at embassies in foreigncountries or in large cities), this technique may also be used to bringvoting machines to confined (e.g. bedridden) individuals or toindividuals on military bases or ships at sea, for example.

Various systems may be used to execute the processes described above, oras variants of the systems described above. FIG. 7 illustrates anembodiment of a network which may be used with an electronic votingsystem. FIG. 8 illustrates an embodiment of a machine which may be usedwith or as part of an electronic voting system. The followingdescription of FIGS. 7-8 is intended to provide an overview of devicehardware and other operating components suitable for performing themethods of the invention described above and hereafter, but is notintended to limit the applicable environments. Similarly, the hardwareand other operating components may be suitable as part of theapparatuses described above. The invention can be practiced with othersystem configurations, including personal computers, multiprocessorsystems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics,network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. Theinvention can also be practiced in distributed computing environmentswhere tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linkedthrough a communications network. Note that in some instances, networkcommunications may not be provided for voting machines, but postinginformation on the internet would require network connectivityelsewhere, for example.

FIG. 7 shows several computer systems that are coupled together througha network 705, such as the internet, along with a cellular or otherwireless network and related cellular or other wireless devices. Theterm “internet” as used herein refers to a network of networks whichuses certain protocols, such as the TCP/IP protocol, and possibly otherprotocols such as the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) for hypertextmarkup language (HTML) documents that make up the world wide web (web).The physical connections of the internet and the protocols andcommunication procedures of the internet are well known to those ofskill in the art.

Access to the internet 705 is typically provided by internet serviceproviders (ISP), such as the ISPs 710 and 715. Users on client systems,such as client computer systems 730, 750, and 760 obtain access to theinternet through the internet service providers, such as ISPs 710 and715. Access to the internet allows users of the client computer systemsto exchange information, receive and send e-mails, and view documents,such as documents which have been prepared in the HTML format. Thesedocuments are often provided by web servers, such as web server 720which is considered to be “on” the internet. Often these web servers areprovided by the ISPs, such as ISP 710, although a computer system can beset up and connected to the internet without that system also being anISP.

The web server 720 is typically at least one computer system whichoperates as a server computer system and is configured to operate withthe protocols of the world wide web and is coupled to the internet.Optionally, the web server 720 can be part of an ISP which providesaccess to the internet for client systems. The web server 720 is showncoupled to the server computer system 725 which itself is coupled to webcontent 795, which can be considered a form of a media database. Whiletwo computer systems 720 and 725 are shown in FIG. 7, the web serversystem 720 and the server computer system 725 can be one computer systemhaving different software components providing the web serverfunctionality and the server functionality provided by the servercomputer system 725 which will be described further below.

Cellular network interface 743 provides an interface between a cellularnetwork and corresponding cellular devices 744, 746 and 748 on one side,and network 705 on the other side. Thus cellular devices 744, 746 and748, which may be personal devices including cellular telephones,two-way pagers, personal digital assistants or other similar devices,may connect with network 705 and exchange information such as email,content, or HTTP-formatted data, for example.

Cellular network interface 743 is representative of wireless networkingin general. In various embodiments, such an interface may also beimplemented as a wireless interface such as a Bluetooth interface, IEEE802.11 interface, or some other form of wireless network. Similarly,devices such as devices 744, 746 and 748 may be implemented tocommunicate via the Bluetooth or 802.11 protocols, for example. Otherdedicated wireless networks may also be implemented in a similarfashion.

Cellular network interface 743 is coupled to computer 740, whichcommunicates with network 705 through modem interface 745. Computer 740may be a personal computer, server computer or the like, and serves as agateway. Thus, computer 740 may be similar to client computers 750 and760 or to gateway computer 775, for example.

Software or content may then be uploaded or downloaded through theconnection provided by interface 743, computer 740 and modem 745.

Client computer systems 730, 750, and 760 can each, with the appropriateweb browsing software, view HTML pages provided by the web server 720.The ISP 710 provides internet connectivity to the client computer system730 through the modem interface 735 which can be considered part of theclient computer system 730. The client computer system can be a personalcomputer system, a network computer, a web TV system, or other suchcomputer system.

Similarly, the ISP 715 provides internet connectivity for client systems750 and 760, although as shown in FIG. 7, the connections are not thesame as for more directly connected computer systems. Client computersystems 750 and 760 are part of a LAN coupled through a gateway computer775. While FIG. 7 shows the interfaces 735 and 745 as generically as a“modem,” each of these interfaces can be an analog modem, isdn modem,cable modem, satellite transmission interface (e.g. “direct PC”), orother interfaces for coupling a computer system to other computersystems.

Client computer systems 750 and 760 are coupled to a LAN 770 throughnetwork interfaces 755 and 765, which can be Ethernet network or othernetwork interfaces. The LAN 770 is also coupled to a gateway computersystem 775 which can provide firewall and other internet relatedservices for the local area network. This gateway computer system 775 iscoupled to the ISP 715 to provide internet connectivity to the clientcomputer systems 750 and 760. The gateway computer system 775 can be aconventional server computer system. Also, the web server system 720 canbe a conventional server computer system.

Alternatively, a server computer system 780 can be directly coupled tothe LAN 770 through a network interface 785 to provide files 790 andother services to the clients 750, 760, without the need to connect tothe internet through the gateway system 775.

FIG. 8 shows one example of a personal device that can be used as acellular telephone (744, 746 or 748) or similar personal device, or maybe used as a more conventional personal computer, as an embeddedprocessor or local console, or as a PDA, for example. Such a device canbe used to perform many functions depending on implementation, such asmonitoring functions, user interface functions, telephonecommunications, two-way pager communications, personal organizing, orsimilar functions. The system 800 of FIG. 8 may also be used toimplement other devices such as a personal computer, network computer,or other similar systems. The computer system 800 interfaces to externalsystems through the communications interface 820. In a cellulartelephone, this interface is typically a radio interface forcommunication with a cellular network, and may also include some form ofcabled interface for use with an immediately available personalcomputer. In a two-way pager, the communications interface 820 istypically a radio interface for communication with a data transmissionnetwork, but may similarly include a cabled or cradled interface aswell. In a personal digital assistant, communications interface 820typically includes a cradled or cabled interface, and may also includesome form of radio interface such as a Bluetooth or 802.11 interface, ora cellular radio interface for example.

The computer system 800 includes a processor 810, which can be aconventional microprocessor such as an Intel Pentium microprocessor orMotorola power PC microprocessor, a Texas Instruments digital signalprocessor, or some combination of the various types or processors.Memory 840 is coupled to the processor 810 by a bus 870. Memory 840 canbe dynamic random access memory (dram) and can also include static ram(sram), or may include FLASH EEPROM, too. The bus 870 couples theprocessor 810 to the memory 840, also to non-volatile storage 850, todisplay controller 830, and to the input/output (I/O) controller 860.Note that the display controller 830 and I/O controller 860 may beintegrated together, and the display may also provide input.

The display controller 830 controls in the conventional manner a displayon a display device 835 which typically is a liquid crystal display(LCD) or similar flat-panel, small form factor display. The input/outputdevices 855 can include a keyboard, or stylus and touch-screen, and maysometimes be extended to include disk drives, printers, a scanner, andother input and output devices, including a mouse or other pointingdevice. The display controller 830 and the I/O controller 860 can beimplemented with conventional well known technology. A digital imageinput device 865 can be a digital camera which is coupled to an I/Ocontroller 860 in order to allow images from the digital camera to beinput into the device 800.

The non-volatile storage 850 is often a FLASH memory or read-onlymemory, or some combination of the two. A magnetic hard disk, an opticaldisk, or another form of storage for large amounts of data may also beused in some embodiments, though the form factors for such devicestypically preclude installation as a permanent component of the device800. Rather, a mass storage device on another computer is typically usedin conjunction with the more limited storage of the device 800. Some ofthis data is often written, by a direct memory access process, intomemory 840 during execution of software in the device 800. One of skillin the art will immediately recognize that the terms “machine-readablemedium” or “computer-readable medium” includes any type of storagedevice that is accessible by the processor 810 and also encompasses acarrier wave that encodes a data signal.

The device 800 is one example of many possible devices which havedifferent architectures. For example, devices based on an Intelmicroprocessor often have multiple buses, one of which can be aninput/output (I/O) bus for the peripherals and one that directlyconnects the processor 810 and the memory 840 (often referred to as amemory bus). The buses are connected together through bridge componentsthat perform any necessary translation due to differing bus protocols.

In addition, the device 800 is controlled by operating system softwarewhich includes a file management system, such as a disk operatingsystem, which is part of the operating system software. One example ofan operating system software with its associated file management systemsoftware is the family of operating systems known as Windows CE® andWindows® from Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash., and theirassociated file management systems. Another example of an operatingsystem software with its associated file management system software isthe Palm® operating system and its associated file management system.The file management system is typically stored in the non-volatilestorage 850 and causes the processor 810 to execute the various actsrequired by the operating system to input and output data and to storedata in memory, including storing files on the non-volatile storage 850.Other operating systems may be provided by makers of devices, and thoseoperating systems typically will have device-specific features which arenot part of similar operating systems on similar devices. Similarly,WinCE® or Palm® operating systems may be adapted to specific devices forspecific device capabilities.

Device 800 may be integrated onto a single chip or set of chips in someembodiments, and typically is fitted into a small form factor for use asa personal device. Thus, it is not uncommon for a processor, bus,onboard memory, and display/I-O controllers to all be integrated onto asingle chip. Alternatively, functions may be split into several chipswith point-to-point interconnection, causing the bus to be logicallyapparent but not physically obvious from inspection of either the actualdevice or related schematics.

Some portions of the detailed description are presented in terms ofalgorithms and symbolic representations of operations on data bitswithin a computer memory. These algorithmic descriptions andrepresentations are the means used by those skilled in the dataprocessing arts to most effectively convey the substance of their workto others skilled in the art. An algorithm is here, and generally,conceived to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to adesired result. The operations are those requiring physicalmanipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily,these quantities take the form of electrical or magnetic signals capableof being stored, transferred, combined, compared, and otherwisemanipulated. It has proven convenient at times, principally for reasonsof common usage, to refer to these signals as bits, values, elements,symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or the like.

It should be borne in mind, however, that all of these and similar termsare to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and aremerely convenient labels applied to these quantities. Unlessspecifically stated otherwise as apparent from the following discussion,it is appreciated that throughout the description, discussions utilizingterms such as “processing” or “computing” or “calculating” or“determining” or “displaying” or the like, refer to the action andprocesses of a computer system, or similar electronic computing device,that manipulates and transforms data represented as physical(electronic) quantities within the computer system's registers andmemories into other data similarly represented as physical quantitieswithin the computer system memories or registers or other suchinformation storage, transmission or display devices.

The present invention, in some embodiments, also relates to apparatusfor performing the operations herein. This apparatus may be speciallyconstructed for the required purposes, or it may comprise a generalpurpose computer selectively activated or reconfigured by a computerprogram stored in the computer. Such a computer program may be stored ina computer readable storage medium, such as, but is not limited to, anytype of disk including floppy disks, optical disks, CD-ROMs, andmagnetic-optical disks, read-only memories (ROMs), random accessmemories (RAMs), EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards, or any typeof media suitable for storing electronic instructions, and each coupledto a computer system bus.

The algorithms and displays presented herein are not inherently relatedto any particular computer or other apparatus. Various general purposesystems may be used with programs in accordance with the teachingsherein, or it may prove convenient to construct more specializedapparatus to perform the required method steps. The required structurefor a variety of these systems will appear from the description below.In addition, the present invention is not described with reference toany particular programming language, and various embodiments may thus beimplemented using a variety of programming languages.

One aspect of the system not already described is the process forverifying a vote was counted. FIG. 9 illustrates an embodiment of aprocess of checking a vote. Process 900 includes providing a websiteinterface, receiving a receipt identifier, looking up a ballotassociated with the receipt identifier, the process initiates at module910 by providing a website interface. This interface may allow a voterto enter an encoded number from a receipt, or scan a barcode from areceipt for example. At module 920, the receipt identifier is received.The process looks up the associated ballot at module 930, which reportsone of three possible results: i) no ballot with the specified ID existsin the database; ii) a ballot with the specified ID was marked but notcast because the (absentee or provisional) voter was not qualified; iii)a ballot with the specified ID was cast and the ballot is displayed.Thus, a voter may retrieve information related to a cast ballot 940,verify its accuracy and determine if the ballot was counted after theelection.

The election authority website “publishes” ballots collected by a votingmachine during a voting session (e.g., by making them publiclyavailable). Moreover, each ballot has a customized signature, and, thevoting machine creates a single prinate/public key pair for the(potentially) large number of ballots that it records during the votingsession. The website also publishes the public key (created by thevoting machine) so that verification of the ballots recorded by themachine can be made by any member of the public. The election authorityweb site also publishes all the source code and executable code, and asufficiently detailed description of the method of deriving theexecutable from the source to permit a third party to duplicate theresult, including the computing platform, tools and settings the ballottemplates used on each machine, all the associated public keys, and allballots cast. The ballot that has been filled out by a voter andpost-processed and stored by the voting machine may be referred to asthe “signed, tagged, anonymous record” (STAR). That is, this ballot hasa random identifier and a digital signature that identify it and certifyits content, but no connection with the identity of any voter (hence,the “anonymous”). This record is what is stored on the machine WORM,given to the voter, a paper copy is retained by the voting authority andpublished on the internet.

The system provides that anyone can download any ballot and theassociated public key for that voting session and check that thesignature on the ballot corresponds to the session public key and theballot content. The system also provides that anyone can download anentire set of STAR ballots and public keys for any electoraljurisdiction, up to and including an entire state (or all states). Thiswill enable third parties to conduct an automated of check thecorrectness of each ballot and also to conduct their own tally of thevotes for any office or issue.

For the system to work, a certificate or receipt needs to be provided toa voter with recorded votes available. FIG. 10 illustrates an embodimentof a certificate used to evidence a vote. One embodiment of such acertificate is certificate 1000, but many other embodiments may providesufficient voting information for such a system. Certificate 1000includes an election information section 1010, a vote section 1020 andan encoded section 1030. Election information section 1010 providesinformation about the election in which the voter voted—such aslocation, date, precinct, voting machine, etc. Vote section 1020provides information about recorded votes for the ballot correspondingto the certificate 1000. Thus, one may determine what votes should havebeen recorded by the voting machine for the certificate 1000 byinspecting vote section 1020. Encoded section 1030 provides verificationinformation including a randomly generated identifier. For example, adigitally signed numeric representation of the ballot may be encoded,both as a series of characters in the embodiment illustrated. Otherformats for such information may also be employed. From thisinformation, one may then check whether the ballot was properly countedwith a publicly accessible website, for example.

The following discussion provides details of a particular embodiment ofa voting system. Details of this embodiment may be combined with thevarious embodiments discussed above, and parts of the variousembodiments discussed above may be incorporated into this specificembodiment. Accordingly, one may produce new embodiments incorporatingfeatures of various embodiments of this document which embody theinvention event though not described specifically in this document.Statements about the embodiment in the following description should beunderstood to be limiting to this particular embodiment, and not to allembodiments generally.

The system is designed to address various acute problems by attemptingto implement principles that have historically been the goals ofdemocratic elections:

*Anonymity. The voter alone should decide whether and what to discloseabout the choices made on the ballot. The voter should have the right tochoose to disclose nothing, but the right to use and to discloseinformation about one's own vote is also an essential political right.

*Accuracy. There should be clarity in the presentation and marking ofballots, so that they represent the true intent of the voter, and thereshould be zero tolerance for errors in the recording and counting ofvotes.

*Transparency. Voters should be able to see and to understand allaspects of the system, and the maximum possible amount of informationabout all votes cast, consistent with the principle on anonymity, shouldbe made public.

*Confidence. Every election should be subject to quick, reliable andautomatic verification, and there should be effective recourse in theevent that the integrity of the system is shown to have beencompromised.

The invention works by i) the consistent application of cryptographiccertification of election information and results by the electionauthority and its agents, using election equipment and programs itdeploys and ii) the timely and effective dissemination of certifiedmaterial to voters, the public, poll watchers, law enforcementauthorities and other interested parties. The disseminated materialincludes inputs to the election process by the election authorities,such as source and executable code and ballot templates and formats, andthe output of the election process, including ballots cast anonymouslyby voters and tallies of those ballots.

A cryptographic certification should be impossible for anyone (otherthan the certifying party) to forge without detection. given the currentstate of computing technology. Examples of such certificates areencrypted messages generated by private/public key systems that havebeen widely tested by the crytographic community and digital signatures,such as those specified in the Digital Signature Standard of theNational Institute of Standards and Technology. All references in thisdocument to a digital signature should be understood to refer to atleast such a cryptographic certification, and is not dependent on theparticular embodiment.

Effective dissemination of certified material means that thecertificates are readily accessible and readable.

Some technologies employed by the system to provide these features arepublic key signatures—an established method of verifying the integrityof documents—and the Internet and the World Wide Web, which can bringthe public directly into the process of verification.

The system potentially elevates the role of voters to guarantors of theintegrity of the system as well as decision makers. Like democracyitself, the system becomes more secure as individual participation andempowerment increases.

The system is intended to preserve familiar electoral procedures. Forexample, voters go to a local polling place to cast their ballots. Whilethe system retains time-tested aspects of voting procedure, it alsotakes advantage of changes in the technology of voting. In anembodiment, all information is entered and stored in digital form andeach ballot is uniquely tagged in a manner permitting it to be trackedbut ensuring anonymity. Each collection of digital information,including individual ballots and entire voting sessions arecryptographically secured.

The system, in one embodiment, employs specially equipped DirectRecording Electronic (ATM-style) voting machines. Such a machine shouldbe isolated to prevent tampering of any kind and would not require ahard drive, flash drive or other rewritable, nonvolatile memory, networkport or wireless communication capability. All software could reside onROMs and unexpected interruption of operation could be protected bybattery backup. Both the advantages and the drawbacks of DREs have beenwell documented. The following features are also incorporated into thesystem in this embodiment:

1 All software, both source and executable, including templates for thecasting and printing of ballots, are published on the Internet prior toelection day. The system requires publication, with the source code andexecutable code, of a sufficiently detailed description of the method ofderiving the executable from the source to permit a third party toduplicate the result, including the computing platform, tools andsettings. The required tools must be generally available.”

2 At the beginning of an election session each voting machine isinitialized by the election authority with the appropriate software,including the applicable ballot template.

3 At the beginning of the election session, each voting machinegenerates a pair of private/public cryptographic keys (signing andverifying keys). The verifying key is written to the machine'swrite-once record.

4 The local election judges sign in a voter and authorize the casting ofa single ballot.

5 The voting machine assigns a random ID to the ballot.

6 The voter enters a vote on the voting machine with opportunities toreview and modify the vote at any time in the process on paper or on thescreen.

7 The voting machine calculates a unique digital signature for theballot, and makes the signature along with the ID an integral part ofthe ballot.

8 The voting machine records the ballot on a write-once storage mediumand prints two copies of the ballot each including the ID and thedigital signature. One copy is retained for the election officials; thevoter gets the other.

9 If there is another voter, the procedure loops back to signing in thenext voter.

10 After all votes have been cast, the voting machine freezes thewrite-once storage medium and digitally signs the entire session.

11 Digitally signed print outs displaying a list of all uniqueidentifiers, the verifying key, a tally for each candidate and/orquestion on the ballot and the serial number and digital signature ofthe program source from each machine are produced for the electionauthority and for each poll watcher.

12. The private (“signing”) signature key, never having been recorded onany persistent medium is discarded.

13 The ballots recorded on the voting machines' write-once storagemedium, together with the verifying key for them, are downloaded to asingle local computing device, totaled and reported to the centralelection authority.

14 The central election authority publishes all ballots and verifyingkeys on the Internet.

The system in this embodiment builds on DREs' advantages to correcttheir disadvantages. One advantage of a DRE is that it is programmable.This means that it can accommodate any size or style ballot, in anylanguage. Good design can make it very clear and user-friendly. It canbe tailored to enable voting by the physically- or vision-impaired. Itpotentially eliminates overvotes, in which the voter marks the ballotfor two candidates for the same office. And it potentially greatlyreduces the frequency of undervotes, in which the voter unintentionallyfails to vote on some matter. Undervotes, in particular, have been amajor source of the failure of traditional ballots to correctly recordvoter intentions.

A disadvantage of the DRE is that it does not provide any way to checkthat the votes cast are correctly recorded or that the votes cast areaccurately tallied. The fact that a DRE is programmable is one source ofthis profound defect: computer programs may give wrong results, eitherby design or by accident. It is, in most cases, impossible to guaranteethe correctness of a computer program. The public is aware of theconsequences of programming errors (“bugs”) from such examples as the“crashes” of their personal computers and by news reports of programmingerrors that have destroyed space exploration missions. There issubstantial evidence that DRE errors have already altered the outcome ofelections in the United States.

Requiring that the computer source code used in a DRE be available forpublic inspection would help with this problem, but would not solve it.Among other things, it would leave unresolved the problem of assuringthat the code actually running on the voting machines was the same asthat submitted for public review. This embodiment requires that thesource and executable code of all computer programs, both applicationand control, used in the election be published and be made available forpublic inspection, that the election authority audit the actual codeused on the machines before and after the election and that the codeexecuting on the voting appliance be testable for authenticity at anytime during the course of the voting session. A second problem is thatDREs store information in electronic form. Electronic information iseasily altered in ways that may be difficult or impossible to detect,unless special steps are taken to protect it.

The embodiment of this system is potentially vendor-neutral. Anymanufacturer may produce machines and programs adhering to this votingprotocol, making it less likely that voting machine manufacture will bemonopolized. This should help keep down the costs of the system andpreclude the possibility of partisan ownership of crucial components ofthe election apparatus. The machine could be a commodity computer, whichwould have the advantage of permitting it to be a multi-purpose machine.Or it could be a dedicated machine, with no disk drive or otherpersistent memory other than the write-once device, capable of executinga program on a ROM chip, which would have desirable security features.Other machines may also be used.

On election day each voting machine publicly displays a constantlyupdated count of the number of votes cast, confirming that each votercasts one, and only one, vote and that this vote has been recorded. Thispermits an ongoing comparison of the number of votes cast with thenumber of applications for ballots.

The system adds five elements to the election process, building on thefact that a DRE is a programmable device (that is, a computer) and thatthe votes cast on it are available in electronic form. These measurespotentially make it possible for each voter to confirm that their votewas correctly recorded and counted.

First, the voting machine assigns a unique random identifier to eachballot that is cast and records this identifier on each representationof the ballot (paper or electronic). This random identifier is similarto the identifier given to a rental car or airline reservation. It doesnot compromise the anonymity of the voter because it is not based on anyinformation about the voter.

Second, the voting machine calculates a unique digital signature foreach ballot, based on the ballot's random identifier and the way thevoter has marked the ballot. The digital signature is calculated usingthe Digital Signature Standard approved by the U.S. government, or othersecure scheme for generating digital signatures. The Digital SignatureStandard is already in widespread use for applications requiring highsecurity. The digital signature provides evidence that the vote was caston a particular machine in a particular election session and has notbeen altered.

According to one type of approach, a digital signature is associatedwith a pair of numbers called keys: one key in the pair is used to signa digital document, the other is used to verify the signature. While thesecond key verifies the signature, it also verifies that the signeddocument has not been altered. In the cryptographic literature these areusually referred to as the private key and the public key, respectively.

Each voting machine generates a private/public (signing/verifying) pairof keys at the beginning of a voting session. It immediately records theverifying key on its write-once storage medium. It uses the signing keythroughout the session to sign each ballot that is cast. According toone approach, the voting machine does not write down the signing key onpaper or records it on any other persistent storage medium; nor does itcommunicate the signing key or reveal it to either the voter or thevoting authorities. The machine is not connected to any network. Thesigning key is discarded at the end of the voting session.

Third, the voting machine records each completed ballot to a location ona write-once storage medium in a manner which makes it impossible todetermine the order in which the votes were cast. Information that isrecorded on a write-once storage medium cannot be erased or altered. Anexample is a write-once disk that is written to using a CD burner. Atworst, the information may be corruptible under such circumstances.

Fourth, the voting machine generates two paper copies of the voter'scompleted ballot. One is retained by the voting authority, and can beused to conduct an election audit, if necessary. The other is given tothe voter. Special features potentially guard against use for votebuying.

Fifth is the transparent reporting feature of the system. After thepolls close, print outs are produced for the election authority and eachof the poll watchers from each machine detailing all unique identifiers,the verifying key, a tally for each candidate and/or question on theballot and the serial number and digital signature of the programsource. The voting machine with the write-once storage medium and allother read and/or write devices still locked inside is returned to thecentral election authority. Then the central election authoritypublishes the entire set of ballots on the Internet so that they areavailable to the public at large. The set of verifying keys arepublished along with the ballots. The complete set of ballots andverifying keys may be effectively and cheaply published using, forexample, BitTorrent technology.

After the polls close and the ballots are published on the Internet, avoter may go on line and look up the ballot that matches the uniqueidentifier (that is, the “reservation number”) on their ballot. Thevoter enters this number, and the election authority displays thecorresponding ballot, which the voter may then check. The voter may alsocall up all the votes cast in a precinct or other electoraljurisdiction.

The process of checking that a ballot has been properly counted ispotentially similar to checking on the delivery of a package that hasbeen barcoded and is electronically scanned at its destination. Indeed,the ballot identification number could easily be barcoded on eachprinted ballot, permitting it to be read with a wand, just as bar codeson merchandise are read at a check-out counter.

Transparency is a feature of the system that potentially enables thepublic to confirm the integrity of the process as a whole. The publicverification may begin to take place as soon as the ballots arepublished.

Each voter may check their own vote, and large numbers may be expectedto do so in an elementary exercise of democracy. This alone makes itunlikely that any systematic alteration or discarding of votes will goundetected. A single lost or altered ballot may be all that is requiredto trigger a full-scale election audit. Anyone can prove that a ballothas been lost or altered by producing a printed ballot that can beverified by one of the published verifying keys, but which is absentfrom the published ballots.

The ability to check the number of ballots cast in each precinct againstthe number of ballots issued by the voting authority provides asafeguard against electronic ballot-box stuffing. The two numbers mustbe equal—or something is clearly wrong. A paper trail including eachunique identifier, verifying key, a tally of the vote for each candidateand/or question on the ballot and the serial number and digitalsignature of the program source is produced to prevent wholesalereplacement of the votes cast on each machine.

The ability to examine each ballot and ascertain that it isauthenticated by the digital signature of the corresponding votingmachine provides a second guarantee against votes being added oraltered.

The ability to download all ballots and conduct an independent count ofthe votes on each ballot item potentially prevents tallying errors fromgoing undetected.

Voting is a compact between voters and government. The systempotentially protects both. The digital signatures employed by the systemprotect against vote tampering or loss and simultaneously protect thevoting system against mistaken or malicious charges of fraud. A chargethat a particular ballot has been lost or altered is credible if—andonly if—the charge is backed up by a paper version of that ballot thathas been digitally signed by a voting machine, which can be determinedby the use of the corresponding published verifying keys. The DigitalSignature Standard produces a signature that is considered, for allpractical purposes, to be unforgeable, and it undergoes periodic publicreview to assure that it remains secure in the face of advances incomputing and cryptography.

A requirement that Direct Recording Electronic machines produce a papertrail would substantially enhance confidence in the security of theelection process. However, a paper trail alone is potentially inadequatefor two reasons. First, a paper trail is useless if the paper ballotsare not counted, and such a count occurs only in an official audit.Triggering an audit is generally a difficult, expensive, time-consumingprocess. Courts tend to be very reluctant to overturn elections, eventhose with many irregularities. In practice there are few audits. Thesystem builds in direct voter verification of the integrity of everyelection, reliably detects any material error that may occur, andtriggers the use of the paper trail in the case of a single provablylost or altered vote.

Second, it is impossible, using an ordinary DRE with a printer attached,to guarantee that the paper ballots produced correspond to theelectronic votes cast. This is a fundamental defect of a paper record ofan electronic vote. It is entirely possible for a computer program todisplay one thing to the voter and to record something different.

The problem occurs at the interface between the digital and the physicalparts of a hybrid system.

The system potentially remedies this problem by building in checks thatare integral to the digital form in which the ballot is originally cast,namely, a random identifier (“reservation code”) and a digital signaturethat are unique to each ballot and that stick to the ballot and a meansof testing the executing code to ensure it authenticity. This, togetherwith the public reporting of the ballots, enables the voter to directlycheck the ballot after it has been cast and recorded.

Giving the voter a paper record of the ballot is a step toward voterempowerment, because it contains a digital signature that proves that itwas legitimately cast. This record does not violate the secrecy of thevote—it remains the decision of the voter alone whether to disclose howshe or he voted. But possession of the paper record of the ballot doespermit the voter to take ownership of their own vote in a qualitativelynew way—namely, by assuring that it was not tampered with after it wascast. The right to vote is meaningless unless it is backed by the rightto guarantee that the vote is properly counted.

The right of the voter to ensure that every vote has been recorded andtallied as cast potentially far outweighs the traditional argument fordenying voters a copy of their ballot: that a vote receipt would enablevote buying or vote coercion. However, it is not necessary to make thistradeoff; the system both potentially guarantees a correct count ofvotes and suppresses vote buying.

The rising number of absentee ballots that are cast by mail or otherwiseoutside the normal controls of the polling place creates widespread newopportunities for vote buying or other corruption of the electoralprocess. Whenever a vote is cast outside of the guaranteed secrecy of apolling booth, a would-be vote buyer may actually be able to takephysical control of the casting of the ballot. The system eliminatesthis practice; all votes, including absentee ballots, are cast onmachines in the system under conditions established by law.

Traditionally, the prohibition on voter receipts stems from a fear thata proof of ballot content would facilitate vote buying, since the votebuyer would be assured of a

return on investment. The system eliminates that certainty and, inpractice, reduces the value of a purchased vote to the level of a votepurchased with no receipt, or less.

Because the system requires the publication in advance of the electionof all source and executable code, including ballot formats and outputtemplates, anyone with a computer could produce counterfeit ballots atalmost no cost and in unlimited numbers, flooding the streets with phonyballots. Such counterfeits could not be detected until after theelection was completed and the verifying keys of legitimate votingsessions were published. Until then, a legally cast ballot would beindistinguishable from a counterfeit. The would-be buyer of votes wouldbe confronted with a large number of counterfeit offers, driving downthe return on investment in bought votes to near zero.

To ensure that the purchased votes were not forgeries, the vote buyerwould have to collect vote receipts (or key information from thereceipt) and record the identity of the seller, while asking the sellerto forgo payment until after the election results had been published.The seller would have no means of enforcing the completion of thetransaction. The inescapably low level of trust between buyer and sellerwould make this form of vote buying unlikely.

Even worse for the vote buyer, the digital signature provides a way ofmarking each forged vote receipt, much like marking the bills used topay off a ransom. This would provide a powerful new tool to lawenforcement officials to pressure street-level operatives to turn in thepolitical boss who financed the vote-buying operation.

Receipts presented for the first time for payment after the electionwould similarly be of no value, since indistinguishable duplicatereceipts could readily be produced from the published results.Counterfeit ballots would present no threat to the integrity of theelection process proper because digital signatures are potentiallyunforgeable. Counterfeit ballots would be easily and reliably detectedafter the publication of the verifying keys. Widespread knowledge of theworthlessness of counterfeit receipts after the publication of theverifying keys would potentially serve to enhance popular confidence inthe integrity of the electoral system.

Absentee voting has become a much more widespread practice recently.Advance votes cast at public polling places account for a substantialpercentage of votes in some states. U.S. citizens abroad, both militaryand civilian, may also vote by absentee ballot. The mailed paper ballotsystem of absentee voting has often prevented these votes from beingcounted in a timely way and has sometimes led to uncertainty andcontroversy over the accuracy of the count.

Absentee ballots in this system may only be cast in advance on a votingmachine in a public polling place in the voter's home state, or on avoting machine in a U.S. embassy or any location with a sufficientconcentration of voters abroad. In any case, duly authorized electionofficials control the polling place.

The voting procedure for absentee ballots differs from in-personelection-day voting only in the following respects:

Each ballot is recorded on a separate write-once medium, which remainsin the possession of the voting authority.

The ballots, both electronic and paper, are marked as “receipt forabsentee ballot.”

The voting authority's copy of the paper ballot is placed in sealedEnvelope A. Envelope A, along with the write-once copy of the ballot, isplaced in sealed Envelope B. Envelope B, along with the voter'sapplication for an absentee ballot, is placed in sealed Envelope C.Envelope C is delivered to the voter's local jurisdiction. It is mailedto the local jurisdiction in the case that the polling place is a U.S.embassy or other remote polling place.

On election day, the local election officials open Envelope C, examinethe application for ballot and determine if the voter is qualified. Ifthe application is approved, the write-once medium is removed fromEnvelope B and processed through a voting machine. This voting machineproduces a new digital signature for the ballot, drops a paper copy ofthe newly signed ballot directly into the ballot box and writes thenewly signed ballot to its write-once record. The absentee ballot thenbecomes indistinguishable from non-absentee ballots cast on thatmachine. The original paper

ballot in Envelope A remains sealed, to be used only if needed for anaudit of the paper trail. If the local voting authority finds the voterunqualified, the unique random identifier is posted to the Internet withthe notation “Voter not qualified.” A disqualified ballot is, of course,not tallied.

The system handles provisional votes in a manner similar to absenteeballots, except that they are processed only after election day. This ispreferably done in accordance with applicable election law. Theprovisional ballots may be segregated on a separate write-once mediumfor this purpose, for example.

One skilled in the art will appreciate that although specific examplesand embodiments of the system and methods have been described forpurposes of illustration, various modifications can be made withoutdeviating from the present invention. For example, embodiments of thepresent invention may be applied to many different types of databases,systems and application programs. Moreover, features of one embodimentmay be incorporated into other embodiments, even where those featuresare not described together in a single embodiment within the presentdocument.

1. A method comprising: creating a private key and a public keycryptographic key pair; generating a unique and random identifier for avoter's vote; accepting an election vote from said voter; electronicallysigning said vote and said identifier with said private key to create adigital signature; providing said vote and said identifier in a humanreadable format to said voter and providing said digital signature tosaid voter; generating a second unique and random identifier for asecond voter's vote; accepting a second election vote from said secondvoter; electronically signing said second vote and said secondidentifier with said private key to create a second digital signature;providing said second vote and said second identifier in a humanreadable format to said second voter and providing said second digitalsignature to said second voter; publishing said public key on aninternet; publicly providing information on said internet thatassociates together: (i) said voter's vote in a human readable format,(ii) said identifier in a human readable format, and (iii) said digitalsignature wherein, said voter's vote is verifiable with said digitalsignature and said public key; publicly providing information on saidinternet that associates together: (iv) said second voter's vote in ahuman readable format, (v) said second identifier in a human readableformat, and (vi) said second digital signature wherein, said secondvoter's vote is verifiable with said second digital signature and saidpublic key; in response to receiving a request from said Internetcontaining said identifier, providing (i), (ii) and (iii) above throughan internet communication; in response to receiving a second requestfrom said internet containing said second identifier, providing (iv),(v) and (vi) above through a second internet communication. 2-25.(canceled)